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suspect, and fairly rigorous safeguards must be met in order
to justify it.
The lack of consistency among the Circuits in dealing with
the question of employer interrogation suggests the need for a
definitive ruling from the Supreme Court. Such a ruling should
reject both the first and third approaches mentioned above. The
per se doctrine is too inflexible and would not seem to be re-
quired by the Act. On the other hand, the third approach does
not sufficiently appreciate the great danger inherent in em-
ployer interrogation and lacks specific guidelines by which con-
duct can be tested. The most reasonable view is to recognize that
interrogation can sometimes be useful and harmless, but that it
can very easily lend itself to abuse. Thus, any definitive ruling
should lay down the requirements to be met in order to justify
such interrogation. Some of the cases discussed above suggest
several which should certainly be included; the purpose must
be legitimate (and the legitimate purposes should be spelled
out) ; there should be no background of employer hostility toward
the union; the employee should be apprised of the purpose of the
inquiry and assured against reprisal; the interrogation must not
be coercive by its nature (to be considered here are the identity
of the interrogator and the place and method of interrogation)
and, finally, the interrogation must be confined to the necessities
of the legitimate purpose.
Philip R. Riegel, Jr.
OPEN HoUSING-1866 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT-1968 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT-THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.1 petitioner alleged that re-
spondents refused to sell petitioner a home for the sole reason
that he was Negro, and prayed for an injunction under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1982. The United States District Court denied relief, 2 and
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.3 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and reversed on the ground that
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. Section
1982, was intended to reach private acts of discrimination and
that the act Was constitutional under the thirteenth amendment.
This Note offers a comparison of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
1. 892 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
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as interpreted in Jones v. Mayer with the Civil Rights Act of
1968, and a consideration of the decision and its effect on the
traditional interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The 1968 Act
The Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 19684 pro-
hibits discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin in the sale and rental of housing,5 in the provision
of facilities connected with the sale or rental of housing,6 in the
financing of housing,7 and in the provision of brokerage serv-
ices.8 It further prohibits advertisements which indicate a pref-
erence on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.9
Until December 31, 1968, its prohibitions apply only to federally
owned dwellings or dwellings built with the assistance of fed-
eral grants or loans.10 After that date all dwellings other than
those sold or rented by those defined in the act to be bona fide
individual owners will fall within the scope of the statute. After
December 31, 1969 even this latter type will:be covered if a
broker or agent is used or if the advertising indicates a dis-
criminatory preference. 1 Religious organizations and private
clubs may limit sale or rental of housing to their own members.
12
An aggrieved party may either sue in his own name for in-
junction and damages, including punitive damages up to $1,000,
or he may call upon the Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment for assistance. 13 The Secretary is authorized to inves-
tigate the complaint and attempt to resolve the problem by in-
formal methods. Should the efforts of the Secretary be unsuc-
cessful.the aggrieved party still may bring a civil action in his
own name. 1'4 In cases where there is apparently a pattern of
resistance to the provisions of the act or there is an issue of
general public importance the Attorney General may intervene
by filing suit.15
4. Pub. L. 90-284, tit. VIII (April 11, 1968), 82 Stat. 73 (1968 CODE CON-
GRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIvE NEws 706 (May 5, 1968) ), hereinafter referred
to as the FAIR HOUSING TITLE OF THE 1968 ACT.
5. Id. § 804(a).
6. Id. § 804(b).
7. Id. § 805.
8. Id. § 806.
9. Id. § 804(c).
10. Id. § 803 (a).
11. Id. § 803(b).
12. Id. § 807.
13. Id. §§ 810,812.
14. Id. § 810(d).
15. Id. § 813.
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The 1866 Act Compared
In contrast to the detailed provisions of the 1968 Act, 42
U.S.C. Section 1982 provides simply, "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The most
important distinction between the 1968 Act and the 1866 Act
is that under Jones6 the latter prohibits private discrimination
in any sale or lease while the 1968 Act carefully exempts in-
dividual owners from its provisions provided they do not use
brokers or advertising which indicates a discriminatory prefer-
ence. 17 The 1866 Civil Rights Act has a much more limited scope
of application than the new Fair Housing Title, for as the Court
in Jones v. Mayer says:
"The statute in this case [42 U.S.C. § 1982] deals only with
racial discrimination and does not address itself to dis-
crimination on grounds of religion or national origin. It
does not deal specifically with discrimination in the pro-
vision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or
rental of a dwelling. It does not prohibit advertising or other
representations that indicate discriminatory preferences. It
does not refer explicitly to discrimination in financing ar-
rangements or in the provision of brokerage services. It does
not empower a federal administrative agency to assist ag-
grieved parties. It makes no provisions for the intervention
of the Attorney General. And, although it can be enforced
by injunction, it contains no provisions expressly author-
izing a federal court to order the payment of damages."
The Court is apparently unwilling to apply Section 1982 to any
situation other than racial discrimination directly related to the
sale or lease of property. Of course, whether the 1866 Act
reaches brokerage and financing services or discrimination
other than on account of race will be of no importance after
December 31, 1969, when the 1968 Act obtains its full coverage. 19
As the above quotation indicates, an award of damages is
not expressly provided for in the 1866 Act. However, in a foot-
note the Court states that there is good precedent for an award
of damages even where not expressly authorized by a statute
16. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
17. FAIR HOUSING TITLE OF THE 1968 ACT § 803(b) (1).
18. 392 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1968).
19. FAnIR HOUSING TITLE OF THE 1968 ACT § 803.
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and that damages possibly could be awarded in the proper cir-
cumstances under Section 1982.20 But even though damages may
be awarded in a proper case, Section 1982 can be enforced only
by the aggrieved party bringing suit in federal court. Such a
remedy is anemic compared to the vigorous enforcement pro-
visions of the 1968 Act. Clearly the wisest course in most cases
would be to apply to the Secretary of HUD for assistance under
the Civil Rights Act of 1968. However, the 1968 Act applies only
to real property while Section 1982 applies to real or personal
property,2 1 and it may be that Section 1982 will find its greatest
application in cases involving personal property.
The Opinion and Dissent
Much of the Jones v. Mayer decision is devoted to showing
that Congress in 1866 did intend to reach private acts of dis-
crimination by the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Justice
Harlan's dissent on this point is much more convincing than is
Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority. At the outset the
majority found that there was no case squarely holding that
Section 1982 or its predecessors were not intended to reach
private discrimination ;22 thus the Court was not bound by the
Civil Rights Cases,2 3 Corrigan v. Buckley,24 or Hurd v. Hodge,25
all of which strongly indicate Section 1982 was not intended to
reach private acts of discrimination.26 As a prelude to its con-
sideration of the legislative history, the Court declared that
Section 1982 appeared on its face "to prohibit all discrimina-
tion against Negroes in the sale or rental of property. '27 How-
ever, as the dissent pointed out, "there is an inherent ambiguity
in the term 'right' as used in § 1982.' '28 It may mean either "a
right to equal status under the law . . . or . . . an 'absolute'
right enforceable against private individuals. ''29 Justice Harlan
believed that the statute on its face suggests the former inter-
pretation ;30 it does not, at least, demand the latter.
20. 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.14 (1968).
21. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) to the FAIR HOUSING TITLE OF THE
1968 ACT.
22. 293 U.S. 408, 417-20 (1968).
23. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
25. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
26. Cf. the dissenting opinion in Jones, 392 U.S. 409, 450-52 (1968).
27. 392 U.S. 409, 421 (1968).
28. Id. at 452-53.
29. Id. at 453.
30. Id. at 454.
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The Court next referred to the original wording of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866:
"[Section 1] ... [A] ll persons born in the United States
are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States:
and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary, servitude,
except as a punishment for crime shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not-
withstanding.
"[Section 2] ... [A] ny person who under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject,
or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Ter-
ritory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected
by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties
on account of such person having at any time been held in a
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as pun-
ishment for crime ... or by reason of his color or race, than
is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .. ,,31
Since the act reaches custom 32 as well as laws, statutes, ordi-
nances, and regulations the Court felt that Congress must have
intended to secure the rights guaranteed by the statute "against
interference from any source whatever, whether governmental
or private.' '13 Stewart continued, "Indeed, if § 1 had been in-
tended to grant nothing more than an immunity from govern-
mental interference, then much of § 2 would have made no sense
at all. ' '1 4 But surely, as the dissent pointed out, the original
form of the Act indicates even more strongly than Section 1982,
31. Act of April 9, 1886. ch. 31, §§ 1, 2, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted by § 18 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
32. 392 U.S. 409, 423 (1968) : "To the Congress that passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, it was clear the right... might be infringed not only by 'state or
local law' but also by 'custom, or prejudice.' " In a footnote, id. at 423 n.30,
Justice Stewart explained that the words "state or local law" and "custom or
prejudice" were found in a bill passed several weeks before the House began
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The bill was designed to enlarge the power
of the Freedmen's Bureau but was vetoed by the president.
33. Id. at 424.
34. Id.
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which does not contain the words "law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation or custom," that Congress intended the act to apply only
to action under state or community authority.35 Furthermore,
the language of Section 2 "no more implies that § 2 was care-
fully drafted to exempt private violations of § 1 from the
criminal sanctions it imposed,' . . . than it does that § 2 was
carefully drafted to enforce all of the rights secured by § 1."1 6
The Court believed the congressional debates also established
that Congress intended the 1866 Act to reach private acts of
discrimination. The dissent urged most persuasively that Con-
gress did not so intend and succeeded at least in casting sub-
stantial doubt on the majority's analysis of the legislative his-
tory. For instance, the Court gave much weight to comments
made by Senator Trumbull of Illinois, the author of the 1866
Act, which may be read to show that Trumbull did intend the
bill to reach private discrimination.3 7 However, the dissent pre-
sented three clear statements by the Senator that the law would
have effect only in the states which had discriminatory laws.38
It is difficult to believe in view of these statements that Trum-
bull intended his bill to extend to private action. However, the
Court also believed that the civil sanctions of the Act, Section 1,
were to have broader application than the criminal sanctions
in Section 2.39 If this were the case then Trumbull's statements
35. Id. at 454.
36. Id.
37. In one passage the opinion quotes Senator Trumbull's comments on a bill
introduced by Wilson of Massachusetts to strike down all racially discriminatory
laws in the South. Id. at 430: "I hold under that second section... Congress will
have the authority.. . not only to pass the bill of the Senator from Massachusetts,
but a bill that will be much more efficient to protect the freedman in his rights.
And... when the... amendment [the thirteenth] shall have been adopted, if the
information . . . be that the men . . . are deprived of the privilege . . . to buy
and sell when they please ... I shall introduce a bill... that will secure those men
every one of these rights .... It is idle to say a man is free ... who cannot buy and
sell, who cannot enforce his rights." The bill Trumbull introduced was eventually
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Compare the statements made by Trumbull after
his -bill had been introduced, note 38 infra.
38. Id. at 459-60: "On January 20, Senator Trumbull ... uttered the first
of several remarkably similar and wholly unambiguous statements which indicated
that the 'bill was aimed only at 'state action.' He said: 'It [Trumbull's bill] will
have no operation in any State where the laws are equal, where all persons have
the same civil rights without regard to color or race. It will have no operation in
the State of Kentucky when her slave code and all her laws discriminating be-
tween persons on account of race or color shall be abolished.'
"Senator Trumbull several times reiterated this view. On February 2, replying
to Senator Davis of Kentucky, he said,... if the State of Kentucky makes no
discrimination in civil rights between its citizens, this bill has no operation what-
ever in the State of Kentucky.
"On April 4 ... he said: 'It [Trumbull's bill] could have no operation in
Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, or most of the States of the Union.'"
39. Id. at 424-25.
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would not be irreconcilable with the Court's conclusion. But
Harlan demonstrated that one of the passages relied on in sup-
port of the Court's position was quoted clearly out of context
and did not mean, as the Court claimed, that Congressman
Wilson of Iowa, the floor manager of the bill, believed Section 1
had a broader application that Section 2.40 Finally, the dissent
made the common sense point that against the background of
mid-Nineteenth Century America, where racial discrimination
was commonplace, it is incredible to believe Congress would act
to prevent private discrimination.41
Constitutionality of the 1866 Act
The thirteenth amendment is not on its face restricted to
state action 42 as is the fourteenth amendment, and it seems
never to have been seriously doubted that Congress could reach
40. Id. at 425 n.33, where the majority opinion stated: "When Congressman
Loan asked ... Mr. Wilson of Iowa 'why the committee limit the provisions of
the second section to those who act under color of law,' . . . he was obviously in-
quiring why the second section did not also punish those who violated the first
without acting 'under color of law.' Specifically he asked:
"'Why not let them the penalties of § 2 apply to the whole community
where the acts are committed?' Mr. Wilson's reply was particularly revealing.
'If... he had viewed acts not under color of law as not violative of § 1 at all, that
would have been a short answer to the Congressman's query. Instead, Mr. Wilson
found it necessary to explain that the Judiciary Committee did not want to
make 'a general criminal code for the States.' Hence only those who discriminated
'in reference to civil rights... under color of ... local laws' were made subject
to the criminal sanctions of § 2.' "
The dissent, id. at 469, quotes the full exchange between the Congressmen and
it becomes apparent at once that Wilson did not believe § 1 had any broader ap-
plication than § 2:
"Mr. LOAN ... Why does the committee limit the provisions of the second
section to persons who act under the color of law. Why not let them apply to
the whole community where the acts are committed?
"Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. That grows out of the fact that there is discrimina-
tion in reference to civil rights under the local laws of the States. Therefore we
provide that the persons who under the color of these local laws should do these
things shall be liable to this punishment.
"Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. We are not making a general criminal code for
the States.
"Mr. LOAN . . . Why not abrogate those laws instead of inflicting penalties
upon officers who execute writs under them?
"Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. A law without a sanction is of very little force.
"Mr. LOAN. Then why not put it in the bill directly?
"Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. That is what we are trying to do."
41. Id. at 475: "... In this historical context I cannot conceive that...
purely private discrimination not only in the sale or rental of housing but in al1
property transactions would not have received a great deal of criticism explicitly
for this feature. The fact that the 1866 Act received no criticism of this kind is
for me strong additional evidence that it was not regarded as extending so far."
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
"Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
private action under the thirteenth. 43 The question of constitu-
tionality of the 1866 Act, as in other thirteenth amendment
cases, turned not on state action but upon whether Congress had
legislated against activities which imposed badges and inci-
dents of slavery. On this point the Jones opinion said:
"Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and
incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that de-
termination into effective legislation. Nor can we say that
the determination Congress has made is an irrational one.''44
Clearly, the Court considered the determination of what are
badges and incidents of slavery to be primarily a congressional
function and would not overturn legislation under the thirteenth
amendment unless that determination was irrational. On the
other hand, the Civil Rights Cases45 recognized that Congress
had the power to legislate against the badges and incidents of
slavery in support of the thirteenth amendment, but held that
mere discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations,
which the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made illegal, were not badges
of slavery. Thus it was essentially the Court, not Congress, that
determined what constituted badges and incidents of slavery.
Subsequent cases have also considered that determination to be
primarily a judicial function.46 It should be obvious that Con-
gress has now been given much more power to act under the
thirteenth than it had prior to Jones v. Mayer. Yet, far from
overruling the earlier cases, the Jones decision approved lan-
guage used in the Civil Rights Cases concerning the power of
Congress under the thirteenth amendment. 47 Arguably, there
was no need to distinguish the earlier cases from Jones because
much of the rubric used to define the powers of Congress lends
itself to liberal interpretations. In this respect Jones v. Mayer
is similar to Katzenbach v. Morgan'4 a case decided under the
fourteenth amendment which in fact broadened congressional
43. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1904); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883).
44. 392 U.S. 409,440-41 (1968).
45. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
46. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1941) ; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
1 (1905); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1904). Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1895).
47. 392 U.S. 409, 438-42 (1968). The Court did expressly overrule Hodges
v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1905), on the ground that the view expressed therein
as to the power of Congress under the thirteenth amendment was incompatible
with the other cases. In fact, it seems the result of Hodges, not the approach, is
what the Court objects to. Id. at 442-43, n.78.
48. 384 U.S. 641 (1965).
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power under the fourteenth while retaining the earlier formu-
lations of congressional power.
Prior to Katzenbach v. Morgan Congress had been limited
to legislating against state action that denied to citizens the
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 4 9 The Court
in Morgan held invalid a New York statute requiring English
literacy as a voting requirement on the ground that the require-
ment conflicted with Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, although the literacy requirement as applied did not vio-
late the fourteenth amendment. Thus, Congress may now decide
for itself what legislation is appropriate under the fourteenth
amendment provided it does not reach individual action.' The
test of constitutionality cited by the Court in Morgan was the
well-known formulation of Chief Justice Marshall in McCullogh
v. Maryland: "'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutional.' '51 However, there is no reason to believe
that the Court has reserved to itself a greater function in the
fourteenth amendment cases after Morgan than in the thirteenth
amendment cases after Jones. Therefore, as applied to the Re-
construction Amendments, the earlier Marshall formulation and
the rational connection formulation in Jones most probably have
the same meaning.2
Conclusion
By basing the Jones decision on the thirteenth amendment
the Court may have augmented the power of Congress to enact
civil rights legislation. However, it is difficult to imagine what
may now be done under the thirteenth amendment that could
not as effectively be done under the commerce clause and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Nonethe-
less, Congress may now enact civil rights laws without having
49. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944) ; Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 555 (1875).
50. Even this requirement may soon fall as six members of the Court indicated
in the United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), that Congress could reach
private action under the fourteenth amendment. However, the case was decided
on different grounds. Id. at 762, 781.
51. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 383 U.S. 641, 650 (1965), quoting from Mc-
Cullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
52. This is certainly true of the thirteenth amendment because the Court,
in addition to its rational connection test, agreed that the 1866 act met the
requirements of the Marshall formulation. 392 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1968).
[Vol. XXIX
1968] .N
to design legislation around the commerce clause.5 3 Surely it is
more forthright to base civil rights legislation on the recon-
struction amendments which, after all, were designed to pro-
tect human rights than it is to base such acts on the commerce
clause.
J. Broocks Greer, III
TORTS-STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Defendant motorist Guidry, after passing defendant Mc-
Farlain's car while approaching an intersection, stopped on the
wrong side of the two lane highway. As a result defendant Mc-
Farlain's view to the left was obscured so that she failed to see
plaintiff motorcyclist approaching on the intersecting street.
She ventured into the intersection and collided with plaintiff.
The trial court entered judgment against both defendants. On
appeal the judgment was upheld against Mrs. McFarlain but
reversed as to Mr. Guidry, the court stating that as between the
two defendants Guidry's negligence was passive and not the mov-
ing cause of the accident. Monger v. McFarlain, 204 So.2d 86 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1967).
Defendant Guidry violated two provisions of the Highway
Regulatory Act. He passed another car at an intersection and
drove on the left side of the road., Violation of a criminal sta-
tute, although characterized as negligence per se, will not usually
occasion civil liability unless it is deemed to be the "proximate
cause" of some resultant injury.2 In determining proximate cause
in cases of statutory violation it must be found that the injury
which in fact occurred was within the range of risks from
which the legislature intended to afford protection.3
53. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), which
upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of the commerce clause. See
also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
1. LA. R.S. 32:75 (1950) : "No vehicle shall be driven to the left of the center
of the highway."
Id. 32:76 provides in part: "No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the
left side of the highway under the following conditions:
"(2) When approaching within one hundred feet of or traversing any inter-
section or railroad track .... "
2. Theunissen v. Guidry, 244 La. 631, 153 So.2d 869 (1963); Cavalier v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 156 So.2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); Moses v. Mosley,
146 So.2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
3. Dartez v. City of Sulphur, 179 So.2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Moses
v. Mosley, 146 So.2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Comment, 16 L A. L. REv. 391,
395 (1956).
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